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Blockchain-Based Secure Spectrum Trading for
Unmanned Aerial Vehicle Assisted Cellular
Networks: An Operator’s Perspective
Junfei Qiu, David Grace, Senior Member, IEEE, Guoru Ding, Senior Member, IEEE,
Junnan Yao, and Qihui Wu, Senior Member, IEEE
Abstract—Unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) are envisioned
to be widely deployed as an integral component in the next
generation cellular networks, where spectrum sharing between
the aerial and terrestrial communication systems will play an
important role. However, there exist significant security and
privacy challenges due to the untrusted broadcast features and
wireless transmission of the UAV networks. This paper endeavors
to resolve the security issues through proposing a novel privacy-
preserving secure spectrum trading and sharing scheme based on
blockchain technology. Specifically, from the operator’s perspec-
tive, a pricing-based incentive mechanism is firstly introduced,
in which a primary mobile network operator (MNO) leases
its owned spectrum to a secondary UAV network in exchange
for some revenue from the UAV operators. To address the
potential security issues, a spectrum blockchain framework is then
proposed to illustrate detailed operations of how the blockchain
helps to improve the spectrum trading environment. Under this
framework, a Stackelberg game is formulated to jointly maximize
the profits of the MNO and the UAV operators considering
uniform and non-uniform pricing schemes. Security assessment
and numerical results confirm the security and efficiency of our
schemes for spectrum sharing in UAV-assisted cellular networks.
Index Terms—Unmanned aerial vehicle, cellular network,
spectrum trading, blockchain, security and privacy, Stackelberg
game.
I. INTRODUCTION
A. Background and Motivation
In recent years, unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) have
attracted increasing interest and are expected to be an im-
portant complementary part of future wireless communication
networks due to their remarkable advantages of low cost,
high mobility and deployment flexibility [1]–[3]. They can
be deployed either as aerial base stations to enhance the net-
work capacity and expand the coverage for existing terrestrial
networks [4], [5], or as mobile user equipment to carry out
delivery or surveillance tasks in the sky [6], [7].
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Despite many potential applications, to fully reap the ben-
efits of deploying UAVs for communication purposes, some
core technical challenges still need to be faced with. On the
one hand, most UAVs in the market basically operate on
the unlicensed spectrum (e.g., the industrial, scientific and
medical bands), which is usually of limited data rate, unre-
liable and vulnerable to interference, thus severely restricting
the potential performance of UAVs [8]. On the other hand,
there always exist significant security and privacy threats for
UAV-assisted wireless communications due to the untrusted
broadcast features and wireless transmission of UAV net-
works. However, these problems have not been well studied
in existing works. These observations motivate us to focus
on investigating the spectrum usage for UAV-assisted cellular
networks while considering the security and privacy issues in
this paper.
B. Related Work
Due to the scarcity of wireless spectrum, UAVs always need
to share the spectrum with existing communication systems
(e.g., cellular networks with licensed spectrum). However,
traditional spectrum sharing mechanisms through spectrum
sensing [9], [10] or spectrum databases [11] are actually not
efficient for UAV-assisted cellular networks, because spectrum
sensing is generally imperfect and subject to sensing errors
while spectrum databases are based on centralized manage-
ment. It is challenging to apply these methods into UAV net-
works to achieve distributed and reliable communications. To
deal with these challenges, some researchers attempt to exploit
the property-right spectrum sharing techniques operating based
on an agreement where the spectrum owners lease or share
their spectrum to the unlicensed ones in exchange for some
certain services [12], [13]. However, these works do not take
into account the practical challenges of UAV deployments
for cellular services from the perspective of operators. In
fact, UAVs and ground base stations often belong to multiple
different operators, each selfishly seeking to maximize their
individual benefit. In general, the cellular network operators
will be not willing to share their own spectrum to the UAV
networks, since the total usable bandwidth of the cellular
networks is limited, and sharing part of the total bandwidth
with UAVs may harm the capacity of the cellular base stations.
Thus, to promote the adoption of spectrum sharing, some
incentive mechanisms should be developed to motivate the
mutual cooperation between the operators.
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Incentive mechanism design has been extensively stud-
ied for networking problems, such as caching [14], [15],
traffic/computation offloading [16], [17], cooperative com-
munications [18], etc. However, none of them consider the
UAV-assisted application scenarios. Besides, existing incentive
mechanisms with high complexity and centralized control may
not be suitable for UAV networks when considering the energy
constraint and distributed features of UAV networks. Recently,
Hu et al. in [19] investigated the use of contract theory to
formulate the spectrum trading problem between the macro
base station manager and the UAV operators to encourage the
macro base station manager to lease its owned bandwidth to
the UAVs. However, there are significant security and privacy
challenges for such peer-to-peer (P2P) spectrum trading in
UAV-assisted cellular networks for the following reasons. i) It
is insecure for mobile network operators (MNOs) to carry out
large-scale spectrum trading in an untrusted and nontranspar-
ent trading environment, where malicious UAV operators could
heavily threaten cellular network’s security through malicious
exploitation, e.g., falsification, advertising fraudulent spectrum
demands, etc. ii) In traditional centralized spectrum trading,
there is an intermediary managing the trading among the
operators, which may suffer from problems such as single
point of failure and privacy leakage.
In recent years, blockchain technology [20]–[22] has at-
tracted growing attention of researchers, which may provide
possible solutions addressing the above challenges because
of its advantages of decentralization, anonymity and trust.
Blockchain is a decentralized ledger-based storage method,
which provides a unique tool for secure transactions in a
distributed manner without trusted agents [23]. Moreover, in
blockchain-based networks, each node manages a copy of
whole or part of a database from the system. These advantages
enable spectrum trading to be executed in a decentralized,
transparent, and secure market environment. Some recent
works have explored blockchain to address the transaction
security issues for local P2P networks, such as the blockchain-
based anonymous rewarding scheme for vehicle-to-grid net-
works in [24], and utilizing blockchain for crowdsourcing
to preserve the privacy of the participants in [25], [26].
However, these methods can not be directly employed in
localized spectrum trading for energy-limited UAV networks
due to the challenges of the high computation cost associated
with establishing a blockchain. Recently, there are several
works attempting to apply blockchain into UAV networks.
For example, Zhu et al. in [27] used blockchain to con-
struct a decentralized information storage platform for air-to-
ground industrial networks. In [28], a neural-blockchain based
drone-caching approach was designed to ensure ultra-reliable
communications. However, spectrum sharing or trading is not
considered in these works. Moreover, they also do not propose
efficient solutions to deal with the high cost for building a
blockchain.
C. Contributions
Motivated by the aforementioned observations, in this paper,
we exploit the consortium blockchain technology to develop
a secure spectrum trading system named spectrum blockchain
for UAV-assisted cellular networks. A consortium blockchain
is a special blockchain with multiple pre-selected nodes to
establish the distributed shared database with moderate cost
[29], [30]. To deal with the computation-intensive blockchain
creation and verification process, mobile edge computing is
applied to help to offload the computation task to proximate
authorized edge computing nodes. Under the mobile edge
computing aided consortium blockchain framework, secure
spectrum trading between the MNO and the UAV operators
with privacy protection can be achieved in a distributed man-
ner. Moreover, since spectrum pricing along with the amount
of traded spectrum need to be optimized in the spectrum
blockchain, a Stackelberg game is formulated to jointly max-
imize the profits of the MNO and the UAV operators.
Specifically, the contributions of this paper are summarized
as follows:
• A pricing-based incentive mechanism is firstly presented
to motivate the MNO to open its owned spectrum for
UAV networks, in which the MNO acts as a spectrum
seller and leases the idle spectrum to a secondary UAV
network in exchange for some revenue from the UAV
operators.
• To address the potential security and privacy issues
caused by malicious attacks in the spectrum trading
process, a spectrum blockchain framework is proposed to
illustrate the detailed operations of how the blockchain
can help to improve the transaction security without
relying on a third party.
• Under the blockchain framework, a Stackelberg game is
formulated to obtain the optimal spectrum pricing and
purchasing strategies, which can jointly maximize the
revenue of the MNO and the UAV operators.
• Two pricing schemes are investigated, including non-
uniform pricing in which different spectrum prices are
assigned to different UAV operators, and uniform pricing
in which the same price applies to all the UAV operators.
In addition, we develop a non-uniform pricing algorithm
and a distributed spectrum price bargaining algorithm
respectively for the two different pricing cases to achieve
the optimal solutions.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. The sys-
tem model for spectrum trading is introduced in Section II.
Detailed operations of spectrum blockchain are illustrated in
Section III. In Section IV, a Stackelberg game is formulated to
obtain the optimal pricing and purchasing strategies, consid-
ering two different pricing schemes. Security assessment and
numerical results are shown in Section V before the paper is
concluded in Section VI.
II. SYSTEM MODEL FOR SPECTRUM TRADING
A. Network Model
We consider a heterogeneous network, in which one cellular
base station owned by the MNO is overlaid with a number of
UAVs possessed by different UAV operators. The set of UAV
operators is denoted by N , N = [1, 2, · · · , N ]. Since UAVs
always operate on unlicensed spectrum with limited capacity
MANUSCRIPT ACCEPTED FOR PUBLICATION IN IEEE INTERNET OF THINGS JOURNAL, 2019 3
that restricts their performances to provide better services for
local mobile users, UAV operators have a strong wish to be
allowed to share spectrum with the MNO. Nevertheless, the
quality of experience (QoE) of cellular users may diminish if
UAVs take up some spectrum owned by cellular base station
for serving cellular users. Thus, it is difficult for a MNO to be
so altruistic to allow UAV users to access licensed spectrum
without any remuneration.
To deal with the above issues, an incentive mechanism can
be designed to motivate the cooperation between MNO and
UAV operators in which the MNO can lease some idle band-
width to UAVs in exchange for a certain level of profit (e.g.,
revenue) from the UAV networks while the UAVs will benefit
from enhanced quality of service with licensed spectrum. In
this way, both systems can increase their own interest and a
win-win situation can be achieved. Therefore, in this section,
a pricing-based incentive mechanism is introduced to promote
spectrum sharing between the cellular and UAV networks. In
particular, we investigate the spectrum leasing problem and
design an incentive mechanism at the data (message) level
from a network operator’s perspective, in which each UAV
operator can temporally buy some licensed spectrum from the
MNO to provide better services for its local mobile users.
Detailed design considerations are given as follows.
B. Utility Function for the Incentive Mechanism
For the MNO, we define µi as the price for each unit of
bandwidth provided to the UAV operator i. Let bi denote the
spectrum that UAV operator i intends to purchase. Under the
pricing-based incentive mechanism, the MNO’s objective is to
maximize its revenue obtained from selling the spectrum to
the UAV operators. Mathematically, the utility function of the
MNO can be modelled as
UMNO (µ, b) =
N∑
i=1
µibi, (1)
where µ is the spectrum price vector with µ =
[µ1, µ2, · · · , µN ]T , and b is a vector of bandwidth purchased
by UAV operators with b = [b1, b2, · · · , bN ]T . Note that ∀i, bi
is actually a function of µi, i.e., bi
∆
= fi (µi), which indicates
that the amount of the spectrum that each UAV operator is
willing to buy is dependent on its assigned bandwidth price.
Besides, it is assumed that the total available idle bandwidth
of the MNO is Q, i.e., the aggregate allocated spectrum for
all the UAV operators should not be larger than Q, which can
be expressed as
N∑
i=1
bi ≤ Q.
From the spectrum purchaser’s perspective, each UAV oper-
ator i requests spectrum from the MNO according to the real
requirement for serving its own users for a specific application.
Without loss of generality, in this paper, the utility function of
an arbitrary UAV operator is defined as
Ui (bi, µi)
∆
= R (bi, di)− C (bi, µi) , (2)
where R (bi, di) is the payoff/benefit gained from allocated
spectrum, with di denoting the basic bandwidth demand of
UAVs which reflects the service type, and C (bi, µi) is the
cost incurred due to buying the spectrum. Note that each UAV
operator’s utility function consists of two parts: payoff and
cost. In the following, we present how to model them under
the proposed incentive mechanism.
Payoff: The payoff of a UAV operator i is the benefit or
reward gained from allocated spectrum. In this paper, the
payoff is modeled as
R (bi, di) = giH (bi, di) , (3)
where H (bi, di) is the spectrum obtainment gain, and gi is a
positive coefficient converting the spectrum obtainment gain
into monetary reward. Here, we define gi as the spectrum coins
that the UAV operator i possesses to pay for the spectrum
received from the MNO. The spectrum coin is one kind
of digital cryptocurrency which is employed to facilite the
spectrum trading between the MNO and the UAV operators.
More details about the spectrum coins will be given in Section
III. Intuitively, the more spectrum you are allocated, the
more gain you should receive. Thus, H (bi, di) should be an
increasing function of bi. Besides, UAV operators should also
take into account the real demands of serving users when
purchasing bandwidth due to considering the cost of buying
spectrum. In this paper, a log function is used to model the
spectrum obtainment gain, i.e.,
H (bi, di) = log2
(
1 +
bi
di
)
. (4)
Though other functions (such as linear or exponential func-
tions) can also be used to model the spectrum obtainment gain,
log functions are shown in literature to be more suitable to
representing the relationship between the network performance
and a large class of elastic data traffic [31], [32]. It is
observed from (4) that when the amount of received spectrum
is zero (bi = 0), the obtained gain H is also equal to
zero, while the gain increases with the increasing of allocated
spectrum. Moreover, H (bi, di) can also reflect the degree of
“happiness” of the UAV operator if receiving bandwidth bi
under the demand di. These indicate that (4) is able to capture
the relationship between the UAV operators’ benefit and the
received bandwidth.
Cost: C (bi, µi) denotes the cost incurred when UAV op-
erator i purchases spectrum from the MNO. In general, the
cost increases with the increasing of the amount of obtained
spectrum. Thus, it can be easily modeled as
C (bi, µi) = µibi. (5)
Therefore, the utility function of an arbitrary UAV operator
can be written as
Ui (bi, µi) = gilog2
(
1 +
bi
di
)
− µibi. (6)
Obviously, with a larger bandwidth bi, UAV operator i
can obtain a more satisfactory system performance, however,
this also increases the cost. Therefore, optimal strategies are
needed for a rational operator to balance the cost and achieved
benefit in order to maximize its utility.
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C. Security Threats
In the above subsection, we focus on designing a pricing-
based incentive mechanism for spectrum trading between the
cellular and UAV networks. However, this monetary approach
always needs to rely on trusted centers that may not only
leak operators’ privacy, but also be vulnerable to attack. In
addition, due to the untrusted broadcast features and wireless
transmission of the UAV networks, there also exist significant
trust issues which may threaten system security and privacy.
Typically, three kinds of attackers or adversaries may appear:
1) Malicious spectrum provider: A malicious cellular op-
erator who advertises fraudulent spectrum leasing services
without enough available spectrum.
2) Malicious spectrum buyer: A malicious UAV operator
who pretends that it has not received any spectrum from the
cellular operator and refuses to pay.
3) Malicious trusted third party: The malicious trust center
may not only disclose the MNO’s privacy but tamper the UAV
operators’ credit value (e.g., spectrum coins) for profit.
To deal with these security threats, distributed and trust-
ed management schemes are needed to identify and defend
against malicious peers. To this end, we exploit blockchain
technology to provide a trusted environment to enhance secure
spectrum trading among the operators.
III. SPECTRUM BLOCKCHAIN
Blockchain is a P2P decentralized ledger, which is designed
to efficiently record transactions among participants in a
verifiable and permanent way, without relying on a trusted
center. Blockchain technology enables spectrum trading to be
executed in a distributed, transparent and secure market envi-
ronment. Thus, in this section, a blockchain-enabled spectrum
blockchain framework is proposed to support secure spectrum
trading between the cellular and UAV operators.
A. Overview of Spectrum Blockchain
Fig. 1. Framework of spectrum blockchain.
The core issue of the blockchain is a computational process-
ing called “mining” (consensus), in which a set of participants
called “miners” need to solve a complex computation problem,
i.e., proof-of-work puzzle, to confirm and secure the integrity
and validity of transactions before adding the records into
the blockchain. The security and privacy of the blockchain
depend on the distributed consensus mechanism managed by
these miners. However, in a traditional public/permissionless
blockchain (such as Bitcoin and Ethereum), the consensus
stage is executed by all nodes (miners) which leads to high
cost. To relieve the computation-intensive challenge of estab-
lishing a blockchain, unlike existing works, in this paper, we
use consortium blockchain technology to perform distributed
spectrum trading. A consortium blockchain is a special permis-
sioned blockchain in which the consensus process is executed
on pre-selected nodes with moderate cost1. Thus, it is more
suitable and feasible for energy-constraint UAV networks.
Moreover, to further solve the high computing power needed
in blockchain creation, we leverage edge computing as a
network enabler to offload the computation-intensive proof-of-
work puzzles to proximate edge computing nodes. Compared
to traditional cloud computing [34], [35], edge computing
brings network resources (e.g., computation or storage re-
sources) closer to the users which can effectively shorten the
transmissions delay and reduce the energy consumption [36].
The practicality of integrating edge computing and blockchain
comes from both the same decentralized infrastructure and the
same functions of storage and computation [37].
The consortium blockchain-based secure spectrum trading
framework is shown in Fig. 1, which consists of the following
major entities.
• Trusted authority (TA): The TA is responsible for ini-
tializing the whole spectrum trading system, generating
public parameters and cryptographic keys, and managing
the operators’ identities. Note that the TA only serves as a
parameter initializer to provide identity authorization and
certificate issuance of entities before running spectrum
blockchain. It will remain offline for most of the time.
That is to say, this role does not conflict with the
decentralization of the blockchain.
• Spectrum provider and requestors: UAV operators act
as spectrum requestors to purchase bandwidth from the
spectrum provider. The MNO acts as spectrum provider
and leases its own idle licensed spectrum to UAV opera-
tors in return for reward.
• Edge computing nodes: It is assumed that there are
edge devices (nodes) in the system which can provide
computing and storage services. As shown in Fig. 1,
each edge computing node consists of four components:
a transaction server, an account pool, a memory pool and
a computation server. The transaction server collects the
real-time spectrum requests from the UAV operators and
the price announcements from the MNO, and transmits
the trading-related information among the MNO and the
UAV operators via the core network. Here, a digital
cryptocurrency named spectrum coin works as UAV
operators’ digital assets to purchase spectrum from the
MNO. Each UAV operator has a virtual wallet to manage
personal spectrum coins. The account pool in the edge
computing nodes records and stores spectrum coins in
the personal wallet of UAV operators, and the numerical
value of the amount of available spectrum of MNO. The
1As for consortium blockchain, Hyperledger is one of the most famous
application platforms [33].
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memory pool stores all the transaction records of local
operators. The computation server provides computing
power for the process of block generation and validation.
• Smart counters: A built-in smart counter in each entity
records the amount of traded spectrum in real time. The
UAV operators pay the MNO according to the records of
smart counters.
In the framework, the spectrum trading between the UAV
operators and the MNO are forwarded based on blockchain
technology, in which all the transactions should be announced
to the audit edge computing nodes for verification through
broadcasting, instead of direct transactions among them. In
this way, a secure spectrum trading environment can be
established, which guarantees transaction security and privacy
protection. The detailed mechanism of operation is given in
Section III-C.
B. Design Goals
Based on the proposed blockchain-enabled spectrum trading
scheme, the following properties are expected to be achieved:
• Operator authentication. Operators should be authen-
ticated in an anonymous way so that no adversary can
impersonate a registered operator.
• Privacy. The requests, announcements and transactions
do not leak any personal information about their sources
(i.e., anonymity).
• Traceability. The TA can track the identity of a operator
in case of a dispute or something unexpected occurs.
• Reliability. According to the design idea of blockchain,
every operator can manage a copy of the whole block
chains of transactions, and each transaction is related to
the phases of spectrum trading. Thus, an entity is unable
to modify the transactions without authorization.
• Data confidentiality and integrity. The contents of any
trading messages should be protected from the operators,
edge computing nodes, and other entities. All accepted
messages should be transmitted without being altered.
C. Operation Details of Blockchain-based Secure Spectrum
Trading
As depicted in Fig. 2, there are mainly three parts for
the operation of the spectrum blockchain for secure spectrum
trading. (i) Reputation-based miner selection. Since not all
the edge nodes are trusted in the system, those malicious
edge nodes may falsely modify or discard transaction records
during their mining process. Thus, it is necessary to design
a secure and efficient reputation management scheme for
the edge computing nodes and select the candidates with
high reputation acting as active miners to ensure a reliable
consensus process. (ii) Block mining and generation. The
selected edge computing nodes then act as miners to collect
the transaction records from the MNO and the UAV operators,
and perform block generation. (iii) Block verification with
consensus process. A new generated block needs to be audited
by the miners via the consensus mechanism before storing it.
As long as most miners agree on the block data, this block
can be added into the spectrum blockchain. More details are
given in the subsequent discussions.
1) System initialization: In the spectrum blockchain, to
guarantee the data integrity and unforgeability, an elliptic curve
digital signature algorithm and asymmetric cryptography [38]
are utilized for system initialization. Every operator becomes
a legitimate entity with proprietary registration information
after passing identity authentication by a TA, such as a
government department. A UAV operator i can firstly get
its certificate Certi from the TA and the Certi is used
to uniquely identify itself through binding its registration
information, e.g., identity IDi and license plate number. Then
UAV operator i joins the spectrum blockchain network with
its Certi and obtains its public/private key pair (PKi, SKi)
and wallet address addi. Here, each UAV operator’s account
includes its account balance Bali, certificate Certi, current
spectrum coin value gi, public/private key pair (PKi, SKi)
and wallet address addi. The MNO’s account contains its ac-
count balance BalMNO, available spectrum, public/pricate key
pair (PKMNO, SKMNO) and wallet address addMNO. The
asymmetric cryptography scheme for ensuring the authenticity
and integrity of information transmission is expressed as
DecPKi (SigSKi (H (m))) = H (m) , (7)
where SigSKi is the digital signature of sender i with private
key, DecPKi is to decode the signed data with sender i’s
public key, H (m) is the hash digest of message m [39].
When executing system initialization, each operator uploads its
wallet addresses being used to the account pool of its nearest
edge computing node. Operators check the integrity of their
account and download data about their account from a memory
pool in the edge computing nodes. The memory pool stores
all transaction records in the spectrum blockchain.
2) Reputation-based miner selection: Since not all edge
devices/nodes are trusted, an edge node that wants to be a
miner candidate needs to firstly submit its identity-related
information to the TA. The TA verifies the validity of the
edge node by estimating its average reputation according
to feedback information about the reputation opinions from
operators. Only if its average reputation is higher than a trust
threshold or ranked at the forefront, the edge node can be
issued a legitimate certificate and act as a miner to perform
mining task. Here, to calculate edge nodes’ reputation, a
subjective logic model based on historical interactions between
the edge nodes and operators is utilized, which is a framework
for probabilistic information fusion operated on subjective
beliefs about the world [40]. The subjective logic uses the
term “opinion” to indicate the representation of a subjective
belief, and models positive statements, negative statements
and uncertainty. It also provides a broad range of logical
operators to combine and relate different opinions [41]. Thus,
the subjective logic model is a suitable mechanism to quantify
the edge computing nodes’ reputation. The basic procedure of
using a subjective logic model for reputation calculation is
given as follows.
Considering an operator opei and an edge node ej , the oper-
ator may interact with the edge node during the spectrum trad-
ing. The trustworthiness (i.e., local opinion) of opei to ej in the
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Fig. 2. Operation procedure of the blockchain-based secure spectrum trading.
subjective logic can be formally expressed as a local opinion
vector ωi→j , i.e., ωi→j := {beli→j , disi→j , unceri→j}, where
beli→j , disi→j and unceri→j represent the belief, distrust, and
uncertainty, respectively. Here, beli→j , disi→j , unceri→j ∈
[0, 1] and beli→j + disi→j + unceri→j = 1. According to
the subjective logic model, we have

beli→j = (1− unceri→j) NPINPI+NNI ,
disi→j = (1− unceri→j) NNINPI+NNI ,
unceri→j = 1− succei→j ,
(8)
where NPI is the number of positive interactions, while
NNI is the number of negative interactions. The positive
interaction means that the operators believe that the services
provided by edge computing nodes are relevant and useful. The
communication quality succei→j of a link between opei and
ej , i.e., the successful transmission probability of data packets,
determines the uncertainty of local opinion vector unceri→j .
According to ωi→j , the reputation value repi→j represents the
expected belief of operator opei that edge node ej is trusted
and behaves in the spectrum blockchain network, which can
be expressed as
repi→j = beli→j + φunceri→j , (9)
where φ ∈ [0, 1] is the given constant indicating an effect
level of the uncertainty for reputation. Operators can calculate
all edge nodes’ reputation based on (8) and (9). Moreover,
to achieve higher credibility and accuracy, a multi-weight
subjective logic model can be exploited to characterize the
local opinions, considering different influencing factors such
as interaction frequency, interaction timeliness and interaction
effects, while taking into account the recommended opinions
from other operators. Further studies about the multi-weight
subjective logical model can refer to the literature [40], [41].
After calculating the reputation opinions, each operator
votes for y candidates from the edge nodes as the potential
miners according to its local ranking of reputation opinions
for edge nodes. Then, the top k candidates with the highest
reputation are selected to be active miners. These active
miners will be authorized by the TA and join in the spectrum
blockchain to carry out trading-related tasks.
3) Trading spectrum between MNO and UAV operators:
UAV operators send spectrum requests to the transaction server
of a nearby miner (i.e., selected edge node). The transaction
server in the edge node counts the total spectrum demands and
broadcasts these demands to the MNO. The edge node works
as a spectrum broker and sets a pricing-based incentive mecha-
nism (as shown in Section II) to attract MNO for participation
in the spectrum trading. Motivated by the incentive mechanis-
m, the MNO determines its initial spectrum to be leased and
the corresponding price and gives responses to the transaction
server. The transaction server then coordinates and matches the
spectrum supply and demand among the operators. According
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to the pricing-based incentive mechanism in Section II, it can
be seen that both MNO and UAV operators are rational and
selfish in the process of spectrum trading, in which all of the
them attempt to maximize their own benefits. Thus, to balance
spectrum demand and supply in our spectrum blockchain, a
solution for analyzing and determining the optimal spectrum
price for MNO and the optimal spectrum requests for UAV
operators is necessary. Here, a game theoretic method is used
to execute spectrum negotiations and transactions between the
seller and the buyers. More details about the optimal spectrum
trading strategies based on game theory will be given in
Section IV.
After spectrum trading, a UAV operator transfers spectrum
coins from its wallet to the wallet address given by the MNO.
The MNO obtains the latest blockchain data from the memory
pool of edge nodes to verify this payment activity. The UAV
operators generate new transaction records, and the MNO
verifies and digitally signs the transaction records and thus
uploads the records to blockchain miners for audit.
4) Block mining and generation: Edge nodes collect all local
transaction records between spectrum seller and buyers during
a certain period, and then encrypt and digitally sign these
records to guarantee authenticity and accuracy. As shown in
part 2 of Fig. 2, all the transaction records are packaged into
blocks. A block consists of a transaction set, a timestamp,
a hash value of pre-block and other information that are
significant to record. For traceability and verification, each
block has a unique and cryptographic hash to prior blocks in
the spectrum blockchain. Similar to that in Bitcoin, the edge
nodes try to find their own valid proof-of-work about data audit
(i.e., a hash value meeting a certain level of difficulty) [42].
Each edge node calculates the hash value of its block based
on a random nonce value ϕ, timestamp, transactions’ merkel
root, and historical block hash value and so on (denoted as
previousdata), which is written as:
Hash (ϕ+ previousdata) < Ndifficulty, (10)
where Ndifficulty is a number that can be adjusted by the
system to control the speed of finding out the specific nonce
value ϕ [43]. Each authorized edge node (miner) in the
spectrum blockchain competes to create a block by finding a
valid proof-of work (i.e., nonce value ϕ). After a valid proof-
of-work is found, the fastest miner works as a leader and
broadcasts the block and the specific nonce value to other edge
nodes in the spectrum blockchain for audit and verification. If
other edge nodes agree on the block, data information in this
new block will be added to the spectrum blockchain in a linear
and chronological order, and the fastest miner is awarded by
spectrum coins.
5) Block verification with consensus process: To ensure
that each authorized node in the system has a copy of the
recognized version of the whole blockchain, the audit stage,
i.e., the block verification with consensus process should be
carried out. To this end, a distributed consensus algorithm is
proposed in Algorithm 1 to reach consensus efficiently in the
spectrum blockchain. More details are given as follows.
As shown in part 3 of Fig. 2, the miner leader firstly
broadcasts block data Block data, timestamp, and the specific
Algorithm 1 Distributed consensus algorithm
1: The miner leader broadcasts the Block data to all edge
nodes;
2: for all edge computing nodes do
3: if its own data do not contain the block information
then
4: Compare its own data with data in the block;
5: if all the data are identical then
6: Set verify (Block data) = True;
7: else
8: Set verify (Block data) = False;
9: end if
10: Broadcast its audit result to other edge nodes for
mutual supervision and verification;
11: Each edge node compares its result with others and
sends a reply back to the leader;
12: else if its own data contain the block data then
13: No action;
14: end if
15: end for
16: The leader analyzes the received replies from edge nodes;
17: if all the edge nodes approve the block then
18: The leader will send records including current audited
block data and a corresponding signature to all authorized
edge nodes for storage;
19: else if some edge nodes do not agree on the block then
20: The leader checks the audit results and sends the block
data to these edge nodes once again for audit;
21: end if
22: Discard the block that fails to pass the verification;
23: Go back to the step of block generation for next round of
audit.
ϕ to other authorized edge nodes for audit. In order to achieve
mutual supervision and verification, these edge nodes check
the block data and broadcast their audit results with signatures
to each other. After receiving the audit results, each edge node
compares its result with others and sends a reply back to
the miner leader. The reply is made up of the edge node’s
signatures, audit result, comparison result, and the records of
received audit results. The leader performs statistics analysis of
received replies from edge nodes. If the block data is approved
by all the edge nodes, i.e., reaching consensus, the leader
will broadcast records including current audited block data
and a corresponding signature to all authorized edge nodes
for storage. Then, the new block is added into the consortium
blockchain in a linear and chronological order, which contains
a cryptographic hash to the prior block. At the same time,
every node synchronizes its local copy of the blockchain with
the new block. However, if some edge nodes do not agree on
the block data, the leader needs to check the audit results, and
send the ledger update requests to these edge nodes once again
for audit if necessary. At last, the block that fails to pass the
verification will be discarded, and the implementation phase
goes back to the step of block mining and generation for next
round of consensus process.
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IV. OPTIMAL SPECTRUM TRADING STRATEGIES
In this section, we present the problem definition for the
spectrum pricing and the amount of traded spectrum between
the MNO and the UAV operators, and analyze the optimal
strategies that are made in Section III-C to maximize the util-
ities of both sides during the spectrum blockchain management
process.
A. Problem Formulation
In Section II, a pricing-based incentive mechanism is intro-
duced to motivate the spectrum trading between the cellular
networks and the UAV networks. Since both MNO and UAV
operators are selfish and rational entities who try to pursue
personal utility maximization in a distributed manner, it is
obvious that game theory is the most suitable tool to analyze
the problem. The game should involve two phases, in which
the MNO firstly announces the initial price of the spectrum
to be leased and the UAV operators then request the spectrum
according to the price. Thus, it is reasonable to formulate the
process as a Stackelberg game [44], [45].
A Stackelberg game is a strategic game that consists of a
leader and several followers competing with each other on
certain resources. In this paper, we formulate the MNO as the
leader, and the UAV operators as the followers. The leader
(i.e., MNO) needs to finally find the optimal spectrum price µ
to maximize its revenue within its limited available spectrum.
Every follower (i.e., UAV operator) will respond with the best
amount of spectrum request (i.e., bi) based on the price given
by the leader. The optimization problems can be formulated
as follows.
Leader’s spectrum pricing:
max
µ<0
UMNO (µ, b) , (11)
s.t.
N∑
i=1
bi ≤ Q. (12)
Follower’s spectrum purchasing:
max
bi≥0
Ui (bi, µi) , (13)
where UMNO (µ, b) and Ui (bi, µi) are defined in (1) and (6),
respectively.
The above problems together form a Stackelberg game. The
objective is to find the Stackelberg Equilibrium (SE) point(s)
from which neither the leader (MNO) nor the followers
(UAV operators) have incentives to deviate. For the proposed
Stackelberg game, the SE is defined as follows.
Definition 1 (Stackelberg Equilibrium). Let µ∗ be a
solution for the spectrum pricing problem and b∗i be a solution
for the spectrum purchasing problem of the ith UAV operator.
Then the point (µ∗, b∗) is a SE for the proposed Stackelberg
game if for any (µ, b) with µ < 0 and b < 0, the following
conditions are satisfied:
UMNO (µ
∗, b∗) ≥ UMNO (µ, b∗) , (14)
Ui(b
∗
i ,µ
∗) ≥ Ui(bi,µ∗). (15)
Note that the same or different prices can be charged
to the UAV operators, which here are referred to as the
uniform and non-uniform pricing schemes, respectively. In the
following, we use the backward induction method to analyze
the Stackelberg game under these two pricing schemes.
B. Non-Uniform Pricing Scheme
The non-uniform pricing scheme is firstly considered, in
which the MNO can set different unit prices for leasing
spectrum to different UAV operators. If the spectrum price
for a UAV operator i is donated as µi, the optimal spectrum
purchasing problem can be written as
Problem 1: max
bi≥0
gilog2
(
1 +
bi
di
)
− µibi. (16)
It is observed that the objective function is a concave function
over bi, and the constraint is affine. Thus Problem 1 is a convex
optimization problem. For a convex optimization problem,
the optimal solution must satisfy the Karush-Kuhn-Tucher
(KKT) conditions. Therefore, by solving the KKT conditions,
the optimal solution for Problem 1 can be obtained in the
following theorem.
Theorem 1. For a given bandwidth price µi, the optimal
solution for Problem 1 is given by
b∗i =
{ gi
µi ln 2
− di, if µi < gidi ln 2 ,
0, if µi ≥ gidi ln 2 .
(17)
Proof: Please refer to Appendix A.
From the Theorem 1, it is observed that if the bandwidth
price is too high, i.e., µi ≥ gidi ln 2 , UAV operator i will not
buy any bandwidth, which indicates that operator i will not
participate in the game. Besides, under the same spectrum
price, more bandwidth is allocated to the UAV operator with
higher spectrum coins for the same demand type. Substituting
(17) into MNO’s optimal pricing strategies, i.e., combining
(11) and (12), the optimization problem at the MNO side can
be written as
Problem 2: max
µ<0
N∑
i=1
( gi
ln 2
− µidi
)+
, (18)
s.t.
N∑
i=1
(
gi
µi ln 2
− di
)+
≤ Q, (19)
where (·)+ ∆= max (·, 0). Note that the objection function is
a convex function of µ, while the maximization of a convex
function is generally non-convex which is difficult to solve.
However, it is shown in the following that the above problem
can be converted to a series of convex subproblems.
For UAV operator i (i = 1, 2, · · · , N ), we introduce the
following indicator function
χi =
{
1, if µi <
gi
di ln 2
,
0, otherwise.
(20)
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Then, the Problem 2 can be reformulated as
Problem 2a: max
χ,µ<0
N∑
i=1
χi
( gi
ln 2
− µidi
)
, (21)
s.t.
N∑
i=1
χi
(
gi
µi ln 2
− di
)
≤ Q, (22)
χi ∈ {0, 1} , ∀i, (23)
where χ
∆
= [χ1, χ2, · · · , χN ]T . It is observed that the above
problem is still non-convex due to χ. Nevertheless, for a given
indicator vector χ, it is easy to verify that Problem 2a is
convex. Under this observation, we consider a special case
of Problem 2a by assuming that the total available bandwidth
of MNO is sufficient large (i.e., Q is large enough) such that
all the requests from the UAV operators are admitted. As a
result, the indicators for all UAV operators are equal to 1, i.e.,
µi <
gi
di ln 2
, ∀i. Then, Problem 2a can be further converted to
a minimization problem as
Problem 2b: min
µ<0
N∑
i=1
µidi, (24)
s.t.
N∑
i=1
gi
µi ln 2
≤ Q+
N∑
i=1
di. (25)
It is not difficult to see that the above objective function
now becomes convex, and minimization of convex function is
a convex optimization problem. The optimal solution is given
by the following proposition.
Proposition 1. The optimal solution to Problem 2b is given
by
µ∗i =
1
ln 2
√
gi
di
∑N
i=1
√
gidi
Q+
∑N
i=1 di
, ∀i ∈ {1, 2, · · · , N} . (26)
Proof: Please refer to Appendix B.
The optimal solution of Problem 2b can be related to the
original optimization problem, i.e., Problem 2, in the following
proposition.
Proposition 2. The bandwidth prices given by (26) are the
optimal solutions of Problem 2 if and only if the following
condition holds:
Q >
∑N
i=1
√
gidi
mini
√
gi
di
−
N∑
i=1
di. (27)
Proof: Please refer to Appendix C.
Combining with the above results obtained from a number
of subproblems, the original problem can now be addressed.
The optimal solution of Problem 2 is given by the following
theorem.
Theorem 2. Assuming that all the UAV operators are sorted
in the order
g1
d1
> g2
d2
· · · gN−1
dN−1
> gN
dN
, the optimal solution for
Algorithm 2 Non-uniform spectrum pricing and purchasing
algorithm
Input: the number of UAV operators N , basic bandwidth
demand di (i ∈ N ) for each UAV operator, total amount
of available idle spectrum Q, and gi;
Output: Non-uniform spectrum price vector µ and bandwidth
purchasing vector b;
Spectrum Pricing
1: Based on the spectrum blockchain network, an authorized
miner acts as a trusted coordinator and local computation
center, and sets K = N .
2: for K = N → 1 do
3: Sort the K operators such that g1
d1
≥ · · · ≥ gK−1
dK−1
≥
gK
dK
.
4: Compute qK =
∑K
i=1
√
gidi
Q+
∑
K
i=1
di
and compare qK with√
gK
dK
.
5: if qK >
√
gK/dK then
6: Remove the operator K from the game, set K =
K − 1, and go to step 4.
7: else
8: Go to step 9.
9: With qK and K, the spectrum price µi for operator
i is given by
µi =
{
qK
ln 2
√
gi
di
, if i ≤ K
∞, otherwise.
10: end if
11: end for
12: A miner broadcasts the price vector to the UAV operators
in the spectrum blockchain.
Spectrum Purchasing
13: After receiving the spectrum prices, the UAV operators
decide the amount of their spectrum request according to
(17).
14: The miner collects the spectrum demand information from
the UAV operators and provides feedback to the MNO.
15: The MNO finally leases the spectrum bandwidth to the
UAV operators while the UAV operators transfer the
corresponding spectrum coins to the MNO through the
blockchain network with security and privacy protection.
Problem 2 can be expressed as
µ∗ =


qN
ln 2
[√
g1
d1
,
√
g2
d2
, · · · ,
√
gN
dN
]T
, if Q > YN
qN−1
ln 2
[√
g1
d1
, · · · ,
√
gN−1
dN−1
,∞
]T
, if YN ≥ Q > YN−1
...
...
q1
ln 2
[√
g1
d1
,∞, · · · ,∞
]T
, if Y2 ≥ Q > Y1
,
(28)
where qK =
∑K
i=1
√
gidi
Q+
∑
K
i=1
di
, and YK =
∑K
i=1
√
gidi√
gK
dK
−
K∑
i=1
di, ∀K ∈
{1, 2, · · · , N}.
Proof: From the Proposition 2, it is observed that the UAV
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operators which cannot fulfill the condition (27), are removed
from the game and the bandwidth price for these operators
will be set to ∞. If Q > YN , the optimal bandwidth price for
each UAV operator is already obtained by Proposition 2. For
the other intervals of Q, e.g., YN−1 < Q ≤ YN , the proof
of the optimality for the corresponding µ∗ can be obtained
similarly as Proposition 2, and is thus omitted. The proof of
Theorem 2 thus follows.
Now, the Stackelberg game for the non-uniform pricing
scheme is completely solved. With the optimal solution ob-
tained in Theorem 1 and Theorem 2, the SE for the proposed
Stackelberg game is given as follows.
Theorem 3. The SE for the Stackelberg game formulated in
the Problems 1 and 2 is (µ∗, b∗), where µ∗ is given by (28),
and b∗ is given by (17).
In practice, the unique SE can be achieved in a centralized
manner as in [45]. However, it is observed from the Theorem
2 that, to obtain the optimal spectrum price vector µ∗, the
MNO has to collect and measure the network state information
to compute and compare
√
gi/di for each individual UAV
operator i. This will lead to high computation complexity
and communication overhead for the MNO and the UAV
operators. Fortunately, owning to the distributed ledger benefit
of blockchain, such information can be safely collected and
processed by the edge computing nodes and then shared in
the whole network. Moreover, based on the special structure of
(28), to further relieve the burden, we propose an optimal non-
uniform pricing scheme for the MNO and the corresponding
spectrum purchasing scheme for each UAV operator by Al-
gorithm 2. Through leveraging the blockchain and exploiting
miners acting as local coordinators and trusted computation
center, an efficient implementation solution can be available.
C. Uniform Pricing Scheme
In this subsection, the uniform pricing scheme is considered,
in which the MNO charges all the UAV operators the same
unit price for their bandwidth requests, i.e., µi = µ, ∀i. With
a uniform price µ, the optimal bandwidth request for UAV
operators can be easily obtained from (17) by replacing µi
with µ, which is given by the following theorem.
Theorem 4. For a given uniform bandwidth price µ, the
optimal bandwidth request solution for UAV operators is given
by
b∗i =
{ gi
µ ln 2 − di, if µ < gidi ln 2 ,
0, if µ ≥ gi
di ln 2
.
(29)
Then, at the MNO’s side, similar to Problem 2, the optimal
pricing problem can be expressed as
Problem 3: max
µ>0
N∑
i=1
( gi
ln 2
− µdi
)+
, (30)
s.t.
N∑
i=1
(
gi
µ ln 2
− di
)
≤ Q. (31)
It is observed that Problem 3 has similar formation as Problem
2, and its solution can be found in the same way. Details are
thus omitted here for brevity.
Algorithm 3 Distributed spectrum price bargaining algorithm
• Step 1: The MNO sets the initial spectrum price µ, and
sends the µ to a nearby miner in the blockchain network.
The miner records the information and broadcasts the
price to all the UAV operators.
• Step 2: Each UAV operator computes its optimal band-
width request b∗i based on (29) for the given µ, and gives
responses back to the miner.
• Step 3: The miner records the feedback from the
UAV operators and measures the total bandwidth requests∑
i∈N bi, and then transmits the related data to the MNO.
The MNO compares the total demand with its available
spectrum Q. Assume that τ is a small positive constant
that controls the algorithm accuracy, and ∆µ > 0 is a
small step size.
if
∑
i∈N bi > Q+ τ then
The MNO increases the price by ∆µ;
else if
∑
i∈N bi < Q− τ then
The MNO decreases the price by ∆µ;
end if
After that, the MNO sends the new spectrum price to the
miner. Then, the miner updates the price and broadcasts
it to UAV operators. The corresponding transactions are
recorded and verified in the spectrum blockchain to guar-
antee the security.
• Step 4: Step 2 and Step 3 are repeated until∣∣∑
i∈N bi −Q
∣∣ ≤ τ .
Theorem 5. Assuming that all the UAV operators are sorted
in the order g1
d1
> g2
d2
· · · gN−1
dN−1
> gN
dN
, the optimal solution for
Problem 3 is given by
µ∗ =


µ˜N , if Q > Y˜N
µ˜N−1, if Y˜N ≥ Q > Y˜N−1
...
...
µ˜1, if Y˜2 ≥ Q > Y˜1
, (32)
where µ˜K =
∑K
i=1
gi
(Q+
∑
K
i=1
di) ln 2
and Y˜K =
dK
∑K
i=1
gi
gK
−
K∑
i=1
di,
∀K ∈ {1, 2, · · · , N}.
From Theorem 5, it is not difficult to observe that when the
total available bandwidth margin Q is given, the optimal price
strategy is unique. Thus, the SE for this Stackelberg game is
also unique and given as follows.
Theorem 6. The SE for the Stackelberg game formulated
with the uniform pricing scheme is (µ∗, b∗), where µ∗ is given
by (32), and b∗ is given by (29).
For the uniform pricing scheme, to obtain the SE of the pro-
posed Stackelberg game, some insights about the optimization
problem are introduced at first. It can be observed from Prob-
lem 3 that both the objective function and the left hand side
of the constraint condition (31) are monotonically decreasing
functions of µ. Thus, when the constraint condition is satisfied
with equality, the objective function can be maximized. Based
on this fact, a distributed spectrum price bargaining algorithm
is proposed in Algorithm 3 to implement the proposed game.
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It can be seen that Algorithm 3 is a distributed algorithm
which greatly reduces the amount of information that needs
to be exchanged in the network, as compared to centralized
approach. The convergence of the spectrum price bargaining
algorithm is guaranteed by the following facts: (i) the optimal
spectrum price is always obtained when the total idle band-
width of the MNO is fully allocated; (ii) the left hand side
of (31) is a decreasing function of µ; and (iii) the SE for the
proposed Stackelberg game is unique for a given Q.
V. SECURITY ASSESSMENT AND NUMERICAL RESULTS
In this section, a security assessment of our proposed spec-
trum blockchain is firstly given. After that, several numerical
examples are provided to evaluate the performances of the
spectrum trading strategies based on the approach of spectrum
pricing.
A. Security Assessment
Unlike traditional communication security and privacy pro-
tection, our proposed method can ensure spectrum trading se-
curity by leveraging consortium blockchain technology which
can provide a defensive ability against many potential security
attacks. More details about the security assessment for the
spectrum blockchain are listed as follows.
• Without reliance on a trusted intermediary: In our spec-
trum blockchain, operators trade spectrum in a distributed
P2P manner, unlike conventional trading schemes that
have to rely on a globally trusted center. This can
efficiently solve the security threats caused by the central-
ized mechanisms such as single point of failure, privacy
leakage, and denial of service attacks.
• Privacy protection: This feature is guaranteed by the
fact that the trading information is sent in the encrypted
format among the operators and the edge computing
nodes. Without knowledge of the secret key of the sender,
it is impossible to derive the original private message
from the operators.
• Wallet security: As each operator has a unique wallet
corresponding to its spectrum coin account, without au-
thorized keys and certificates, no adversary can open an
operator’s wallet, stealing or distorting spectrum coins
from the wallet.
• Prevention of replay attack: Each transaction is digitally
signed with a unique identifier. Therefore, transactions
with the same identifier will be rejected by the consensus
servers (i.e., pre-selected edge computing nodes), and
thus replay attacks are prevented.
• Transaction authentication: All transactions recorded in
blockchain have been publicly audited and authenticated
by high-reputation authorized edge computing nodes.
Moreover, each block has a unique and fixed hash value,
which can be used to protect the order and the information
of blocks. Since modifying any contents of any block will
cause a change to the hash values of the other blocks,
it is impossible for an adversary to tamper or forge a
transaction due to overwhelming cost.
• Traceability: When a dispute happens in the spectrum
blockchain network, the TA will check one public ledger
to find out the corresponding real identity of the illegal
or misbehaved operator from the anonymous certificate
Cert and registered ID, and revoke its public key. Thus,
the traceability can be guaranteed.
B. Numerical Results
In this subsection, the simulation results are presented to
demonstrate the performances of the proposed pricing-based
spectrum trading scheme. An air-ground spectrum sharing for
UAV-assisted cellular network with one MNO and three UAV
operators is considered. In order to illustrate the impact of
spectrum coins and spectrum demands of UAV operators on
the system performance, two different cases are investigated.
In the first case (i.e., the first three examples), it is assumed
that the spectrum coins of all the UAV operators are the same
while their basic spectrum demands for serving users (i.e.,
application types) are different. Without loss of generality, the
spectrum coins of all the UAV operators are assumed to be
the same with g1 = g2 = g3 = 1. The bandwidth demands
of these UAV operators at the current time are different with
[d1, d2, d3] = [5, 10, 15] units
2. In the second case (i.e., the last
example), the UAV operators have the same spectrum demands
with different spectrum coins.
Example 1. Uniform Pricing vs. Non-Uniform Pricing:
In this example, the performance comparison between the
two schemes of uniform pricing and non-uniform pricing is
examined. Fig. 3 and Fig. 4 show the MNO revenue and
the sum-revenue of UAV operators, respectively, versus the
total available bandwidth Q at the MNO, with uniform or
non-uniform pricing. It is observed that for the same Q, the
revenue of the MNO under the non-uniform pricing scheme is
in general larger than that under the uniform pricing scheme,
while the reverse is generally true for the sum-revenue of
UAV operators. These observations indicate that, from the
perspective of revenue maximization for the MNO, the non-
uniform pricing is preferable compared to uniform pricing. On
the other hand, the uniform pricing scheme is indeed optimal
for the sum-revenue maximization of the UAV operators.
In addition, it is worth noting that when Q is sufficiently
small, the revenues of the MNO become equal for the two
pricing schemes, so are the sum-revenues of UAV operators.
This is because when Q is very small, there is only one
UAV operator active in the network, and thus by comparing
(28) and (32), the non-uniform pricing scheme is same as
the uniform pricing counterpart in the single-UAV operator
case. Besides, it is expected that when Q is sufficiently large,
the revenues of the MNO converge to the same value for the
two pricing schemes. This can be explained as follows. For
the non-uniform pricing scheme, it is observed from (28) that
arbitrary spectrum price µi becomes very small with very large
Q, and thus the objective function of Problem 2 converges to
N∑
i=1
gi
ln 2 as Q→∞. On the other hand, for the uniform pricing
2Since this paper considers spectrum trading purely from the data level,
there is no specific unit for the bandwidth, which can be a general parameter.
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scheme, when Q approaches infinity, the revenue of the MNO
will also converge to
N∑
i=1
gi
ln 2 . Thus, there exists a same upper
bound for the two different pricing schemes.
Example 2. Comparison of Bandwidth Prices for UAV
Operators under Non-Uniform Pricing: In this example, we
examine the optimal bandwidth prices for the UAV operators
with the variation of Q under non-uniform pricing. First, it is
observed from Fig. 5 that, for the same Q, the bandwidth
price for UAV operator 1 is the highest, while that for
UAV operator 3 is the lowest. This is true due to the fact
that g1
d1
> g2
d2
> g3
d3
, where a larger gi
di
indicates that the
corresponding UAV operator can achieve a higher profit with
the same amount bandwidth allocated. Therefore, the operator
with a larger gi
di
has a willingness to pay a higher price to
buy the spectrum. Secondly, it is observed that the differences
between the bandwidth prices decrease with the increasing of
Q. The reason is that when Q increases, it can be seen from
(28) that
∑N
i=1
√
gidi
Q+
∑
N
i=1
di
decreases. Last, it is observed that the
prices for all UAV operators decrease with the increasing of
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Fig. 6. Convergence performance of the distributed spectrum price bargaining
algorithm.
Q, which can be easily inferred from (28). Intuitively, this can
be explained by the practical rule of thumb that if a seller has
a large amount of goods to sell, it would like to price lower
to stimulate consumption.
Example 3. Convergence Performance of Distributed Band-
width Price Bargaining Algorithm: In this example, the con-
vergence performance of the distributed bandwidth price bar-
gaining algorithm (i.e., Algorithm 3) is investigated. Actual-
ly, the distributed bargaining algorithm can be implemented
though the bisection method, for which the implementation
procedure is given as follows. First, the MNO initializes a
lower bound µL and an upper bound µH of the bandwidth
price. Then, the MNO computes µM = (µH+µL)/2 and sends
the µM to a nearby miner (i.e., authorized edge computing
node) through the blockchain network. The miner records the
information and broadcasts it to all the UAV operators. After
receiving µM , UAV operators compute their optimal band-
width requests and give responses back to the miner. The miner
measures the total bandwidth requests
∑
i∈N bi and transmits
the feedback information to the MNO. If
∑N
i=1 bi < Q, the
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Fig. 7. Bandwidth allocation vs. Q.
MNO sets µH = µM ; otherwise, the MNO sets µL = µM .
Then, µM is recomputed based on the new lower and upper
bounds. The algorithm stops when
∣∣∣∑Ni=1 bi −Q∣∣∣ is within the
desired accuracy. It is observed from Fig. 6 that the distributed
bargaining algorithm can converge within 9 iterations for all
values of Q.
Example 4. Relationship between Bandwidth Allocation
and Available Idle Spectrum: In this example, the spectrum
demands of all the UAV operators are assumed to be the
same with d1 = d2 = d3 = 5 units while the spectrum
coins are different with [g1, g2, g3] = [3, 2, 1]. The bandwidth
assignments for the three UAV operators with variation of Q
are shown in Fig. 7. It is observed from Fig. 7 that the UAV
operators with more spectrum coins have a higher priority in
bandwidth obtainment. When the available bandwidth Q is
small, the MNO will reject the request from the operators
with low spectrum coins, and provide the limited resource to
the operators with high spectrum coins. When the available
bandwidth Q is large, the MNO will try to meet every
operator’s request. However, operators with more spectrum
coins are given a higher priority in obtaining the bandwidth. It
is also observed that with the increasing of Q, the bandwidth
assigned for each operators increases. This is due to the fact
that the MNO’s utility is maximized only when it leases all
its available idle spectrum to the UAV operators.
VI. CONCLUSION
In this paper, a consortium blockchain enabled secure
spectrum trading framework is exploited for UAV-assisted
cellular networks, where MNO and UAV operators are able to
trade spectrum in a credible environment without relying on a
trusted third party. Under this framework, a Stackelberg game
model is adopted to jointly study the utility optimization for
the MNO and UAV operators. Non-uniform spectrum pricing
and uniform spectrum pricing schemes are discussed. Addi-
tionally, a non-uniform pricing algorithm with low complexity
and a distributed uniform pricing bargaining algorithm are
respectively designed to obtain the optimal solutions under the
two pricing schemes. A security assessment shows that our
proposed spectrum blockchain improves transaction security
and privacy protection. Numerical results illustrate that the
pricing-based incentive mechanisms are effective and efficient
for spectrum trading. In future work, it is interesting to extend
the utilization of blockchain for broader applications in UAV-
assisted cellular networks, while taking into account more
UAV features such as deployment optimization, trajectory
planning and energy constraint.
APPENDIX A
PROOF OF THEOREM 1
Since the Problem 1 is a convex optimization problem, the
duality gap between this problem and its dual optimization
problem is zero. Thus, we can deal with Problem 1 by solving
its dual problem.
The Lagrangian of the Problem 1 can be written as
L (bi, α) = gilog2
(
1 +
bi
di
)
− µibi + αbi, (33)
where α is nonnegative dual variable associated with the
constraint bi ≥ 0.
The dual function is then defined as h (α) =
maxbi≥0L (bi, α), and the dual problem is given by
minα≥0h (α). Then, the KKT conditions can be written as
follows:
∂L (bi, α)
∂bi
=
gi
(bi + di) ln 2
− µi + α = 0, ∀i, (34)
α ≥ 0, bi ≥ 0, ∀i, (35)
αbi = 0. (36)
From (34), it follows
bi =
gi
(µi − α) ln 2 − di. (37)
Suppose bi > 0 when µi ≥ gidi ln 2 . Then from (36), it
follows that α = 0. Therefore, (37) reduces to bi =
gi
µi ln 2
−di.
Then bi > 0 results in µi <
gi
di ln 2
. This contradicts the
presumption. Therefore, from (35), it follows
bi = 0, if µi ≥ gi
di ln 2
. (38)
Suppose bi = 0 when µi <
gi
di ln 2
. Then, from (37), it
follows µi =
gi
di ln 2
+ α. Since α ≥ 0, it follows µi ≥ gidi ln 2 .
This contradicts the presumption. Thus, bi ̸= 0 for this set of
µi. Then, from (36), it follows α = 0. Therefore, from (37),
it follows
bi =
(
gi
µi ln 2
− di
)
, if µi <
gi
di ln 2
. (39)
Theorem 1 is thus proved.
APPENDIX B
PROOF OF PROPOSITION 1
By introducing the dual variables associated with the band-
width price and amount of total available spectrum constraints,
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the Lagrangine of Problem 2b is given by
L (µ, η,γ) =
N∑
i=1
µidi + η
(
N∑
i=1
gi
µi ln 2
−
N∑
i=1
di −Q
)
−
N∑
i=1
γiµi,
(40)
where η and γi are the nonnegative dual variables associated
with the constraints
∑N
i=1
gi
µi ln 2
≤ Q+∑Ni=1 di and µi ≥ 0,
respectively.
The dual optimization problem is expressed as the maxi-
mization of the Lagrangian
V (µ, η,γ) = max
µ<0
L (µ, η,γ) . (41)
The dual problem is then given by minη≥0,γ<0V (µ, η,γ).
The duality gap is zero for the convex problem addressed here,
and thus solving its dual problem is equivalent to solving the
original problem. Thus the optimal solution needs to satisfy
the following KKT conditions:
∂L (µ, η, γ)
∂µi
= di − ηgi
µi2 ln 2
− γi = 0, ∀i, (42)
η
(
N∑
i=1
gi
µi ln 2
−
N∑
i=1
di −Q
)
= 0, (43)
γiµi = 0, (44)
η ≥ 0, γi ≥ 0, µi ≥ 0, ∀i, (45)∑N
i=1
gi
µi ln 2
−Q−
∑N
i=1
di ≤ 0. (46)
From (42), we can derive
µi
2 =
ηgi
(di − γi) ln 2 , ∀i. (47)
To further analyze the dual problem, we firstly provide the
following two lemmas.
Lemma 1. γi = 0, ∀i.
Proof: Suppose that γi ̸= 0 for any arbitrary i. Then, from
(44), we can derive that µi = 0. Then, since gi > 0, from (47),
it follows that η = 0. Substituting η = 0 into (47), we have
µi = 0, ∀i. However, this result contradicts the condition in
(46). Thus, the asumption that γi ̸= 0 for any given i does not
hold, and we thus have γi = 0, ∀i.
Lemma 2.
∑N
i=1
gi
µi ln 2
−Q−∑Ni=1 di = 0.
Proof: Suppose that
∑N
i=1
gi
µi ln 2
−Q−∑Ni=1 di ̸= 0.
Then, from (43), it follows that η = 0. Substituting η = 0 into
(47), we have µi = 0, ∀i, which contradicts the condition in
(46). Therefore, the aforementioned assumption does not hold,
and we thus have
∑N
i=1
gi
µi ln 2
−Q−∑Ni=1 di = 0.
From Lemma 1, we have γi = 0 for arbitrary i. Since µi ≥
0, thus from (47), it follows µi =
√
ηgi
di ln 2
, ∀i. According
to Lemma 2, it follows that Q +
∑N
i=1 di =
∑N
i=1
gi
µi ln 2
.
Substituting µi =
√
ηgi
di ln 2
into it, we can derive
√
η =
∑N
i=1
√
gidi
ln 2
Q+
∑N
i=1 di
. (48)
Then, it follows
µi =
1
ln 2
√
gi
di
∑N
i=1
√
gidi
Q+
∑N
i=1 di
. (49)
Thus, Proposition 1 is proved.
APPENDIX C
PROOF OF PROPOSITION 2
This proof consists of two parts: the necessity proof and the
sufficiency proof, which are given as follows.
Part I: Sufficiency. The optimal solution to the Problem 2b
is given by (26) with the assumption that that all the indicator
functions are equal to 1, i.e., µi <
gi
di ln 2
, ∀i ∈ {1, 2, · · · , N}.
Submitting (26) into these inequalities yields
√
gi
di ln 2
∑N
i=1
√
gidi
ln 2
Q+
∑N
i=1 di
<
gi
di ln 2
, ∀i ∈ {1, 2, · · · , N} . (50)
Then, (50) can be rewritten as Q >
∑N
i=1
√
gidi√
gi/di
−
N∑
i=1
di, ∀i ∈
{1, 2, · · · , N} . Furthermore, the inequalities given above can
be compactly written as
Q >
∑N
i=1
√
gidi
mini
√
gi
di
−
N∑
i=1
di. (51)
Thus, the sufficiency of the condition in (27) is proved.
Part II: Necessity. This part can be proved by contradiction.
For the ease of exposition, we assume that UAV operators are
sorted by the following order: g1
d1
> · · · gN−1
dN−1
> gN
dN
. Then, in
Proposition 2, the condition becomes Q > YN , where
YN =
∑N
i=1
√
gidi√
gN
dN
−
N∑
i=1
di. (52)
Now, suppose YN−1 < Q ≤ YN , where YN−1 is shown
later in (56). Suppose that µ∗ given by (26) is still optimal for
Problem 2 with YN−1 < Q < YN . Then, since Q ≤ YN , from
(26) we have µ∗N ≥ gNdN ln 2 and thus
(
gN
µ∗
N
− dN
)+
= 0. From
Problem 2, it then follows that µ∗1, . . . , µ
∗
N−1 is the optimal
solution of the following problem
max
µ<0
N−1∑
i=1
( gi
ln 2
− µidi
)+
, (53)
s.t.
N−1∑
i=1
(
gi
µi ln 2
− di
)+
≤ Q. (54)
It is easy to observe that the above problem has the same
structure as the Problem 2. Therefore, according to Proposition
1 and the proof of previous Part I, the optimal solution for this
problem can be given by
µ∗i =
1
ln 2
√
gi
di
∑N−1
i=1
√
gidi
Q+
∑N−1
i=1 di
, ∀i ∈ {1, 2, · · · , N − 1} ,
(55)
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with the condition that Q > YN−1, where YN−1 is expressed
as the threshold for Q above which µ∗i <
gi
di ln 2
, ∀i ∈
{1, 2, · · · , N − 1} holds, i.e.,
YN−1 =
∑N−1
i=1
√
gidi√
gN−1
dN−1
−
N−1∑
i=1
di. (56)
Comparing the optimal bandwidth price solution shown in
(55) with that given in (26), we can find that they are different
from each other, which contradicts with our assumption that
µ∗ is still the optimal solution for Problem 2 with the condition
YN−1 < Q ≤ YN . Thus, we can conclude that only if the
condition Q > YN satisfies, the bandwidth prices given by
(26) are the optimal solutions for Problem 2.
Combining the results obtained in Part I and Part II, it
is concluded that the bandwidth prices given by (26) are
the optimal solutions of Problem 2 if and only if Q >
∑N
i=1
√
gidi
mini
√
gi/di
−
N∑
i=1
di. Thus, Proposition 2 is proved.
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